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Increased competition and the attempts of European banks to increase their presence
in other markets may have affected the efficiency and credit risk. The first of this aspects is
based on the incentive to the banks to reduce cost in order to gain in competitiveness. The
second is associated to their lack of knowledge of such markets and/or acceptance of a
higher risk in order to increase their market share. Despite the importance of these aspects,
banking literature has usually analyzed the effects of competition on the efficiency of
banking systems without considering these aspects. The few studies that attempt to obtain
risk adjusted efficiency measures do not consider that part of the risk is due to exogenous
circumstances. This article proposes a new three stage sequential technique, based on the
DEA model and on the decomposition of risk into its internal and external components, for
obtaining efficiency measures adjusted for risk and environment. It is seen that the technique
allows the use of any existing technique of incorporation of environmental variables in DEA
analysis.
Key words: DEA, credit risk, bad loans, efficiency, environmental variables.
RESUMEN
El incremento de la competencia y los intentos de los bancos europeos por aumentar
su presencia en otros mercados pueden haber afectado tanto al nivel de eficiencia bancaria
como al riesgo de crédito. El primero de los aspectos se fundamenta en el incentivo que
tienen los bancos a reducir los costes para ganar competitividad. El segundo, está asociado a
la ausencia de competencia en tales mercados y/o a la aceptación de niveles mayores de
riesgo con el fin de incrementar la cuota de mercado. A pesar de la importancia de estos
aspectos, la literatura bancaria tradicionalmente ha analizado los efectos de la competencia
en la eficiencia de los sistemas bancarios sin considerar estos efectos sobre el riesgo. Los
escasos estudios que intentan obtener medidas de eficiencia ajustadas por el riesgo no
consideran que parte del riesgo es debido a circunstancias exógenas. Este artículo propone
una nueva técnica secuenciencial en tres etapas, basado en el modelo DEA y en la
descomposición del riesgo en sus componentes externo e interno, para la obtención de
medidas de eficiencia ajustadas por el riesgo y el ambiente. La técnica se aplica al análisis
de la eficiencia de los sistemas bancarios europeos y permite el uso de cualquiera de las
tecnicas existentes para la incorporación de variables ambientales en un contexto DEA.
Palabras clave: DEA, riesgo de crédito, morosidad, eficiencia, variables ambientales.3
1. INTRODUCTION
The increased competition associated with the process of liberalization and
globalization and the attempts of European banks to increase their presence in other markets
may have affected the efficiency and credit risk of the European banking institutions. The
first of these aspects, already analyzed in other studies, is based on the incentive to the banks
to reduce costs and to improve the management of their resources in order to gain in
competitiveness. The second aspect, which has not yet been analyzed, is explained by the
poorer knowledge of the new markets by the newly entered banks and/or the greater
permissiveness in the acceptance of risk with a view to increasing the market share in
certain sectors and/or regions. Despite the importance of these two aspects, banking
literature has usually analyzed banking efficiency without considering them together.
Traditional efficiency measures, based on the consideration of outputs and inputs, are
usually a good instrument of analysis of the performance of firms; however, it is sometimes
necessary to consider other factors. In the case of banking, one of the most important of
these is risk, as it is desirable not only that a banking firm should be efficient, but also that it
should be secure
1. This is certainly not exclusive to the banking sector, but it is of greater
importance than in other sectors, given the potential economic repercussions of banking
failures. However, despite its importance, the relationship between risk and efficiency has
hardly been studied in the literature. Only the studies by Berg et al. (1992), Hughes  et al.
(1993 and 1996) and Mester (1994a, 1994b) have attempted to obtain risk-adjusted
efficiency measures. However, their approaches may be unsuitable insofar as they are based
on the inclusion of risk (measured by means of total bad loans) as an additional input,
implicitly assuming that all bad loans are caused by the bad management of banks, without
considering that some may be due to adverse economic circumstances beyond the banks'
control. If these exogenous or uncontrollable factors are not filtered out, the efficiency of
those firms whose bad loans are due to an adverse economic environment will be
underestimated. Furthermore, none of the existing studies attempts to decompose total bad
                              
1 Toevs and Zizka (1994) affirm that standard ratios, normally used by financial analysts as indicators of
efficiency, do not consider risk. Furthermore, they affirm that to try to improve efficiency can be counter-
productive, as banks may do so by transferring their activities towards high-risk business, with low operating
costs and high profitabilities.4
loans into these two components: bad loans due to bad management (internal factors) and
bad loans due to economic environment (external factors)
2.
International comparisons of banking efficiency have not loomed large in the
literature. The lack of homogeneous accounting data and the existence of different
regulatory frameworks notably complicate these comparisons. The very few studies in this
field, based on the construction of a common frontier for all countries, have traditionally
found high degrees of inefficiency. This result may be due to the fact that the procedure used
implicitly assumes that any difference of efficiency between countries is exclusively due to
bad management, without also considering the possible existence of technological
differences (Pastor, Pérez and Quesada, 1997) or differences in the economic environment
(Pastor, Lozano and Pastor, 1997) which may bias the results and provide under-estimated
efficiency measures for those banking systems that are subjected to less favorable economic
environments. To avoid this problem it is necessary to introduce environmental variables to
control for the different economic circumstances under which the banking firms of different
countries carry out their activity.  In this respect, the most notable exceptions are the recent
studies by Dietsch and Lozano (1996) and Pastor, Lozano and Pastor (1997) which
incorporate environmental variables with the aim of establishing a common standard of
comparison for all firms. However, unlike parametric frontier models, the incorporation of
environmental variables in DEA models is a field still being researched, offering a wide
variety of proposals which have to be considered and compared.
In this context, and in order to solve these problems, this study proposes a new (three
stage) sequential technique, based on the DEA technique, to identify and decompose the
origin of bad loans and to obtain efficiency measures adjusted for risk and environment,
more refined than those hitherto proposed in other studies, to allow analysis of how not only
the evolution of efficiency, but also risk management, have responded to liberalization
measures. The procedure proposed enables the total bad loans of each bank to be
decomposed, in a first phase, into its two components: one part due to bad risk management
and another due to exogenous economic and environmental factors. For this purpose we use
various approaches for incorporating environmental variables into DEA, with the aim of
                              
2 Only Pastor (1999) and Saurina (1998) analyse the determinants of bad loans distinguishing between internal
and external factors, though the latter does not use the results to decompose bad loans.5
testing whether this leads to significant differences in the results. In the second phase,
incorporating into the model only the proportion of bad loans due to bad management, we
obtain the risk-adjusted efficiency measures. Finally, in the third phase, by incorporating
economic environment variables, we obtain indicators of efficiency which, as well as being
adjusted for risk, are adjusted for the economic environment. The results are used to
determine the influence on efficiency of risk ("risk effect") and of environment
("environment effect").
The paper is organized as follows. The second section reviews the existing studies on
risk and efficiency, the studies that analyze international comparisons of efficiency and the
different proposals for incorporation of environmental variables into DEA. Section 3 lays
out the methodology proposed for decomposing bad loans and calculating the risk
management efficiency and the risk and environment-adjusted efficiency measures. This
methodology allows the application of the different proposals for incorporation of
environmental variables into DEA models. This section also describes the procedure for
decomposing the overall efficiency measure into the risk and environment-adjusted
efficiency, the risk effect and the environment effect. Section 4 describes the data used,
section 5 gives the results, and finally section 6 presents the conclusions.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. The relationship between risk and efficiency
There are many aspects in which credit risk (usually measured through bad loans,
problem loans or provisions for loans losses) is related to efficiency. They have all been
excellently analyzed by Berger et al. (1997) who find that there is a negative relationship
between cost efficiency and risk in failed banks
3.
Berger et al (1997) offer several reasons for this negative relationship. First,
inefficient banks, as well as having problems of controlling their internal costs, may have
                              
3 Other studies find that failed banks are usually cost inefficient (Berger et al., 1992; Barr et al., 1994;
Wheelock et al., 1995 and Becher, et al., 1995), or that an increase in bad loans is usually preceded by an
increase in cost inefficiency (De Young et al., 1994).6
problems in the assessment of the credit risk, so that a bad management of costs goes
together with greater credit risk. Berger et al (1997) call this origin of risk "bad management
hypothesis". Second, bad loans may arise because of adverse economic circumstances
beyond the bank's control, so that banks have to spend more resources to recover the
problem loans. This origin of credit risk they call "bad luck hypothesis". Alternatively, there
could be a positive relationship between cost efficiency and credit risk when banks decide
not to spend sufficient resources on analyzing loan applications. In this way they would
appear to be efficient but with a high level of bad loans. Berger et al (1997) call this
"skimping hypothesis".
In spite of the extensive analysis by Berger et al. (1997), their procedure, based on
the Granger causality test, does not enable the origins of risk to be found at individual level,
but reaches very broad conclusions for the industry as a whole. Also, the conclusions will
depend on the proportion of banks acting on each particular hypothesis, so the results
obtained will always be underestimated because firms do not act uniformly
4. Furthermore,
as they themselves affirm, the Granger causality test measures statistical associations that in
no way imply economic causation.
In the literature on banking there is no study that decomposes the origins of bad
loans and, although some studies have attempted to obtain risk-adjusted efficiency
measures
5, the method used is unsuitable for two fundamental reasons. First, these studies
attempt to obtain risk-adjusted efficiency measures by introducing the measurement of credit
risk (bad loans) directly in the model as an additional input. This procedure would
characterize banks adequately only if bad loans originated exclusively in the "bad
management" of risk. However, this situation is not reasonable, as the economic
environment also influences banks' levels of bad loans, so that part of them is due to what
Berger et al. (1997) call "bad luck".  If what is wanted is to evaluate the efficiency of banks
while controlling for risk, only the proportion bad loan caused by internal factors ("bad
management") should be considered, while the proportion of bad loan caused by external
factors ("bad luck") should be excluded.
                              
4 Berger and De Young find that some hypotheses are only consistent with sub-sets of data, as when the whole
set of data is considered there is a mixture of effects.
5 The first study was by Berg et al (1992) using the DEA technique. Subsequently Hughes et al. (1993 and
1996), Mester (1994a, 1994b) used parametric techniques.7
Second, not all bad loans have the same probability of being recovered. The
European central banks, following the European Union directives, regulate the provisions to
be made in each particular circumstance. Therefore, given that these provisions are directly
related to the probability of recovering the loans, it seems more appropriate to measure the
risk by using the provisions for loans losses (PLL) instead of loans losses itself, as the first
implicitly considers the risk associated with each problem loan.
Therefore, unlike the approach of Berger et al. (1997), which only enables generic
conclusions to be reached, this study proposed a technique for identifying the causes of bad
loan at individual level (using their terminology, "bad management" or "bad luck") and,
unlike Hughes et al. (1993 and 1996) and Mester (1994a, 1994b) who obtain measurements
of efficiency adjusted for risk by considering total bad loans, this study only incorporates
that proportion caused by internal factors ("bad management"). The method proposed is
applied to the commercial banks of the principal European banking systems with the aim of
analyzing how the efficiency of banking firms and their behavior have evolved in the face of
the risk implicit in the creation of the Single Market and the processes of de-regulation.
2.2. International comparisons of banking efficiency
International comparison of banking efficiency, although it has been researched
before, has not loomed large in the literature. The only studies
6 are those by Berg et al.,
Førsund, Hjalmarson and Suominen (1993), Berg, Bukh and Førsund (1995) and
Bergendahl, (1995), who compare the efficiency of the banking systems of the Scandinavian
countries, Fecher and Pestieau (1993) who applied free distribution frontier techniques to
the analysis of eleven countries of the OECD, Pastor, Pérez and Quesada (1997) who
applied the DEA technique and the Malmquist index to the analysis of the efficiency and
productivity of eight countries of the OECD, Allen and Rai (1996) who used the free
distribution and parametric stochastic frontier techniques to compare the efficiency of fifteen
developed countries, Dietsch and Lozano (1996) who used a parametric frontier to test
whether the technology of the French and Spanish banking systems is similar when
environmental variables are considered, and Pastor, Lozano and Pastor (1997) who analyze
the efficiency filtered for environmental factors of ten community countries.
                              
6 See Berger and Humphrey (1997).8
With the only exception of Pastor, Pérez and Quesada (1997), all these studies share
the characteristic of being based on the construction of a common frontier for all countries
and assume, at least implicitly, that the differences of efficiency among banking systems are
due only to differences in management. Nevertheless, it is possible that the technology
underlying the production of banking services may be different, and that the differences in
efficiency reflect the existence of different technologies, as shown by Pastor, Pérez and
Quesada (1997) or alternatively it is possible that the technology may be very similar, so that
the efficiency is in fact reflecting differences specific to the environment of each country, as
shown by Dietsch and Lozano (1996) and Pastor, Lozano and Pastor (1997). If this is so, i.e.
if there exist important differences in the environment, the construction of a common
frontier that does not consider these differences will generate underestimated measurements
of efficiency, because efficiency would not only be incorporating bad management but also
the existence of an unfavorable environment. Indeed, except for the cases where very similar
banking systems are being analyzed (Berg et al., 1993 & 1995), the measurements of
efficiency obtained are usually very low.
One way of solving these problems, without having to resort to the construction of a
specific frontier for each banking system, is to consider a homogeneous line of banking
business in order to ensure that the technology of the banks specializing in that business will
be similar, and to incorporate environmental variables in order to guarantee that the
comparison will be made considering exclusively firms subject to a similar environment
7.
Thus, in this study, as in Pastor, Pérez and Quesada (1997) and Pastor, Lozano and
Pastor (1997), only banks specializing in commercial bank business are considered, and as
in Dietsch and Lozano (1996) and Pastor, Lozano and Pastor (1997) a set of environmental
variables are considered.
                              
7 Pastor, Pérez and Quesada 1997) use only commercial banks, Pastor, Lozano and Pastor (1997) likewise use
commercial banks and incorporate environmental variables. However, in both cases the heterogeneity of the
sample is still high, and consequently the measurements of efficiency are still very low.9
2.3. DEA Model: Incorporation of environmental variables into DEA models
Measurements of efficiency in traditional DEA models are obtained by solving N
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where  () yy y y ii iR i = 12 , ,...,   is the vector of R outputs,  () xx x x ii iS i = 12 , ,...,  is the vector of
S inputs. Solving the above problem for each of the N banks we obtain N optimum
solutions. Each optimum solution ϑ j
* is the efficiency measure of  bank j and, by
construction, satisfies ϑ j
* ≤ 1. Those banks with ϑ j
* < 1 are considered inefficient, while
those with ϑ j
* = 1  are considered efficient
8.
Unlike parametric models, in which incorporation of environment variables is direct,
since they entry as additional explanatory variables, in DEA this is a field in which research
is still being done and about which there is no consensus. The problem arise because there is
not information about the negative or positive influence of each environment variable, in
other words, the researcher does not know if a given variable should be considered as output
or as input. The proposals are very varied (Rouse, 1996) and can be classified into methods
of one, two and three stages.
The one-stage approach is the most direct and most easily interpreted, and consists of
considering together outputs, inputs and environmental variables, restricting the problem of
                              
8 From an intuitive point of view, to analyse the efficiency of the productive scheme of firm j (yj, xj) the
problem constructs a feasible scheme as a linear combination of the schemes of the N firms of the sample
which, using ϑ jxj inputs produce at least yj. In this way, (1-ϑ j) indicates the maximum radial reduction to which
the input vector of firm j can be subjected without altering the observed levels of input, so that ϑ j is the
indicator of technical efficiency. In the event that ϑ j=1, what occurs is that t is not possible to find any linear
combination of firms which, with less input, obtains at least as much output, so that the firm is catalogued as
efficient. In the other cases, ϑ j<1, indicating that the productive scheme followed by firm j is inefficient, since
another feasible alternative scheme exists which obtains the same amount of output using ϑ jxj input,
quantifying its overuse of resources in comparison with the alternative scheme as (1-ϑ j)xj.10
optimization to only the outputs and/or inputs. This method, proposed by Banker et al.
(1986a & 1986b), has the aim of limiting the field of comparison to only those units of
decision subject to equal or worse environmental conditions. However, despite being easy to
interpret and to apply, it poses three fundamental problems: 1) the influence of each
environmental variable has to be known a priori in order to orientate its influence on the
optimization; 2) Those units of decision in worse condition are, by definition, considered to
be efficient; and 3) the number of efficient units grows with the number of environmental
variables introduced (restrictions)
9.
The commonest two-stage method consists of regressing in a second stage the
indices of efficiency obtained in the first stage against the set of environmental variables
10.
It has usually been criticized for the fact that the indices of efficiency generated are not
contained in the interval (0,1]. However, this criticism is groundless if we apply limited
dependent variable models (Tobit) or simply regress an exponential function in order to
prevent predictions above unity
11. The advantages of this procedure are: 1) easy
implementation; 2) possibility of considering many environmental variables simultaneously
without increasing the number of efficient units; 3) there is no need to know the orientation
of the influence of each environmental variable; and 4) possibility of use when some (or all)
of the environmental variables are common to sub-sets of individuals.
Lastly, Fried and Lovell (1996) propose a three-stage method. In the first stage they
propose using a DEA model with inputs and outputs. In the second stage, they include the
slacks obtained in the first stage and the environmental variables in a stochastic frontier
                              
9 The first problem is not usually very important, as on most occasions the influence of the environmental
variables is well known. However, the second problem is especially serious in those cases where a broad set of
individuals share the same environmental conditions, as in this case this whole sub-set would be considered
efficient. Pastor, Lozano and Pastor (1997) propose a solution to this problem, consisting of grouping the
environmental variables into intervals in order to widen the field of comparison. Ray (1988), Golany et al.
(1993) and Cooper et al. (1996)
10 The first to apply this technique was Timmer (1971). After him, limited dependent variable models have
been used profusely (McCarty et al., 1993). This procedure has traditionally been used to explain differences in
efficiency rather than to filter their impact.
11 An alternative two stage method is that of Pastor (1995b). This method is based on the application of DEA
only to inputs (or outputs) and to the environmental variables in a first stage. In the second stage Pastor
(1995b) proposes radial expansion of the inputs (or outputs) top eliminate the effect of the environmental
variables. The procedure, though it has the advantage of generating predictions contained within the interval
(0,1], presents the disadvantage that in the first stage outputs are not considered, and firms that use more inputs
are assumed to do so because of unfavourable circumstances, without considering that it is because they
produce more output.11
approach (SFA) model or in a DEA model. The aim is to obtain slacks filtered for the
influence of the environmental variables. These filtered slacks are used to adjust the inputs
(and/or outputs) which will be used in the third stage to obtain the definitive indices of
efficiency filtered for the environmental variables. It is not clear whether the high cost of this
method in terms of time and computation requirements is compensated by a notable
improvement in the results. Only the stochastic frontier version, by incorporating
randomness, could present certain virtues in comparison with other methods.
In order to test the virtues and disadvantages of each of these methods (see table 1),
in this study all of them are used and compared.
3. METHODOLOGY
3.1. Phase 1: Risk management efficiency and decomposition of bad loans
It has been shown in previous sections that bad loans can appear due to two different
causes: internal and external. Given that external causes are beyond the control of the firms,
the efficiency measure in the management of risk must be calculated by eliminating the
effect of these external factors on bad loan.
This section describes the method, based on the DEA technique and on the
incorporation of environmental variables, for estimating efficiency in risk management and
decomposing our measurement of credit risk (PLL) into the part due to internal factors
associated with bad management and the part due to external factors. The procedure consists
of comparing each bank with a linear combination of banks which, with an equal (or higher)
volume of loans, have a smaller (or equal) amount of PLL  given the environmental
conditions. The proposed technique enables the use of any of the existing techniques of
incorporation of environmental variables into DEA. Since allowance is made for the
environment (or the state of the economy) the indicator of efficiency obtained (γ j) indicates
the potential reduction of PLL that could be achieved without reducing the total amount of
loans granted, given the existing state of the economy. We call this measurement "risk
management efficiency" because it measures the proportion of bad loans (measured byTable 1: Methods to include environmental variables  in a DEA model.
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Fried et al. (1996), Rouse 
(1996).12
means of the PLL) that is attributable to bad risk management. If a particular firm j has an
indicator γ j=1 it means that there is another firm (or linear combination of firms) that grants
an equal or greater amount of loans with a lower degree of bad loan (1-γ j )PLLj<PLLj 
12.
This indicator of "risk management efficiency" (γ j) can be obtained by any of the
three methods described before which will now be set out in greater detail.
3.1.1.  Single stage method
The indicator of "efficiency in risk management" (γ j) is obtained in the single stage
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in which N  is the number of firms (i=1,..,N),  λ i is the vector of weights, PLLi is the
provisions for loans losses, Li is the volume of loans, and   () ZZ Z Z ii i P i
++ + + = 12 , ,...,  and
() ZZ Z Z ii i Q i
−− − − = 12 , ,...,  are the vectors of environmental variables (economic cycle) with
positive or negative influence respectively
13.
                              
12 Note that greater inefficiency in the management of risk may reflect a lower aversion to risk on the part of
firms, so that certain firms may prefer to accept a lower probability of repayment of the loan provided they
obtain a higher rate of interest. In any case, the indicator obtained here measures firms' implicit risks, whether
due to bad management or to reduced aversion to risk.
13 Environmental variables are treated in the model as inputs or outputs by inverting their influence. Thus, for
example, if an environmental variable has a positive influence (more means better) it is considered as input in
the model (see Cooper et al, 1996). Note that all the environmental variables are treated as non-discretional
variables (see Banker et al, 1986a).13
3.1.2.  Two-stage method
In the first stage of two stage models, the indicators of "risk management efficiency"
(γ j) are obtained by calculating efficiency indices without correcting for environmental
variables ( ) γ i




































In the second stage these uncorrected efficiency indices are regressed, taking the
environmental variables (Z) as independent variables.  In order to contain the efficiency
indices within the interval (0,1], either a Tobit model or a logistic regression model can be
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The predictions of the regression model would be the definitive efficiency indices
adjusted for environmental variables which in our case would be the indicators of
"efficiency in risk management" (γ j).
3.1.3.  Three-stage methods
The three-stage method is based on obtaining the slacks resulting from problem [3].
These slacks (si) are calculated as the difference between the optimum values and the real
values for each firm,  j
N
i i i j PLL PLL s − = ∑ = 1λ In the second stage the slacks are filtered for
environmental variables using a stochastic frontier model (SFA) or a DEA model. In the first
case Fired et al (1996) proposed adding the corrected slacks to the original inputs, in our
case to the PLL, and incorporating them into the third stage of the conventional DEA model.
If DEA is used, the slacks obtained in the first stage are included with the environmental
variables in the second stage to obtain corrected inputs, in our case the corrected PLL. In the
third stage the corrected inputs, in this case the corrected PLL, are included in the final DEA14
model. For greater detail see the appendix.
In all cases the optimum solution, γ j offers the proportion of PLL that bank j could
reduce if it improved its risk management without altering the amount granted in loans. If
γ j=1 it means that there is no bank or linear combination of banks which with equal (or
greater) amount of loans, and given the environmental conditions, has a lower volume of
PLL than bank j. In this case, all the PLL would be due to external factors and bank j would
be efficient in risk management, even though it had a certain degree of risk (PLL) as this
would originate in the unfavorable economic conditions. In general, γ j ≤ 1, lower values of
γ j mean lower proportions of PLL due to internal factors, so that γ j represents the proportion
of PLL of bank j that is due to external factors and 1-γ j is a measurement of the proportion
due to internal factors.
3.2 Phase 2: Efficiency adjusted for risk
However, these traditional measurements of efficiency ϑ j do not consider risk. If we
wish to consider risk, as well as efficiency, to evaluate the performance of firms, it is
necessary to "reward" (by increasing efficiency) those banks that are good managers of risk.
For this purpose, Hughes et al (1993 and 1996) and Mester (1994a, 1994b) incorporated
total bad loan as a measurement of firms' risk management. However, for the reasons given
above, this measurement may be contaminated by economic shocks exogenous to the firms,
which must be discounted so as not to penalize banks that are subjected to an adverse
environment. In this study it is proposed to incorporate only that part of bad loan that is due
to internal factors or bad management
14. More specifically, given that γ j measures the
efficiency of risk management and (1-γ j) measures the proportion of bad loan which is due
to bad risk management, it is obvious that (1-γ j)PLLj measures the volume of PLL that is
due to the risk policy of the firm (internal factors). Therefore, the efficiency measure
adjusted for risk would be obtained by solving the following problem:
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in which only the part of PLL due to internal factors, (1-γ j)PLLj (obtained in phase 1 by any
of the procedures described) have been included.  The efficiency measure adjusted for risk ρ j
is a more suitable measurement of banking firms' performance than those of Berg et al
(1992), Hughes et al. (1993, 1996) or Mester (1994a, 1994b), as it only penalizes those
banks whose bad loans are due exclusively to bad risk management.
Comparison of the efficiency measure not adjusted for risk (ϑ j) obtained in problem
[1] with the efficiency measure adjusted for risk (ρ j) obtained in problem [5] offers a
measurement of the impact of risk management on the efficiency of banking form j, i.e. this
comparison is a measurement of the "prize" or "penalty" in the efficiency measure awarded
to it depending on how it manages risk. We call this impact the "risk management effect"








If a bank has RME<1 this means it manages risk well, takes few risks and
consequently has "won a prize" in terms of a efficiency measured adjusted for risk (ρ j)
higher than the unadjusted measure (ϑ j). If, on the other hand, RME=1, it means that adding
risk to the model has no effect on efficiency since the banks manage risk as well as better
than other inputs
15.
                              
15 Note that the risk effect is always less than or equal to unity, meaning that the added restriction benefits the
indices of efficiency or leaves them as they were. However this does not necessarily occur in the other
procedures.16
3.3 Efficiency adjusted for risk and environment: Phase 3
Although measurements of efficiency adjusted for risk (ρ j) offer a more suitable
evaluation of firms' performance, further refinement is still required, as the environment in
which firms carry out their activity influences efficiency, sometimes decisively. To achieve a
efficiency measure in which all firms are evaluated by the same standard, it is necessary to
refine the efficiency measure adjusted for risk by including other environmental variables.
This efficiency measure adjusted for risk and the environment (Ω ) would be obtained by
incorporating the effect of environmental variables by any of the procedures described
earlier, with two reservations: 1) Now instead of PLL all inputs have to be corrected, and 2)
the environmental variables that influence bad loan are not necessarily the same as those that
influence efficiency.
The optimum solutions that include risk and environment will provide measurements
of efficiency adjusted for risk and environment (Ω j). As before, the ratio between the
measurements of efficiency adjusted for risk (ρ j) and  the efficiency measures adjusted for
risk and environment (Ω j) offer us information on the degree of influence of  the
environment on the efficiency of the banks. We call this coefficient the "environment effect"








If EEj <1, this means that the environment is unfavorable for the firm, as when it is
compared only with the set of firms that are subject to the same conditions or worse, the
efficiency measure improves. If, on the other hand, EEj>1, this means that the efficiency
measure has penalized the firm, since the unadjusted measurements of efficiency attributed
to efficiency what in fact was only a favorable environment
16.
Reformulating the above expressions, it is possible to decompose the efficiency
measure with variable returns to scale of bank j into several components:
                              
16 Note that, unlike the risk effect, except in the single stage models, the environment effect may be a risk
greater than unity.17











Expression [8] offers information on the origins of the efficiency measure under
VRS (ϑ j), so that this can be explained in terms of the efficiency measure adjusted for risk
and environment (Ω j), of the environment effect  (EEj) and of the risk management effect
(RMEj).
4. DATA AND VARIABLES
International comparisons of efficiency must be very careful in the selection of data.
Not only the possible accounting heterogeneity of the variables used has to be considered,
but also the different specializations and the different environment. In this study the data
base was obtained from IBCA Ltd., an international rating agency which homogenizes the
information and classifies firms in terms of specialization, so that the accounting uniformity
is guaranteed. Homogenization of specialization was achieved by considering only
commercial banks, therefore excluding other categories such as savings banks, state-owned
banks, industrial and development banks, etc.
Since the key variable of the analysis is the provisions for loans losses (PLL) only
those countries that report this variable as a separate item from other provisions could be
selected
17. This limits the analysis to Spain, Italy, France and Germany
18. The total sample
consists of 2598 observations from 1988 to 1994: 1144 observations of French commercial
banks, 387 Italian, 524 Spanish and 543 German. In the case of Germany, due to the lack of
PLL data the period studied is 1992-1994.
Inputs and outputs.  In the banking literature there is no general agreement as to the proper
definition of inputs and outputs. In this study, as in Pastor (1995a, 1996), Pastor, Pérez and
Quesada (1997) and Pastor, Lozano and Pastor (1996), we opted to use the "value added"
                              
17 Unfortunately, information about loan losses is available only for a very small sample of banks. This fact
makes impossible the comparison of the results obtained using PLL with those obtained using loans losses,
which is the variable often used in the literature.
18 Although only four countries form the European Community are considered, the sample chosen represented
in 1994 59.8% of the total assets of the European Community's commercial banks.18
approach (Berger and Humphrey, 1992) and selected three outputs: y1=loans, y2=deposits,
y3=other earning assets; and two inputs: x1=personnel expenses and x2=operating costs
(excluding personnel expenses and including financial costs).
Environmental variables
19: The environment variables were selected for their influence both
on bad loan and on efficiency. A priori, only economic cycle variables influence bad loans,
whereas other structural variables influence efficiency. With regard to the former, it was
assumed that greater variability of the economic cycle has a positive influence on bad loan.
To capture this influence the inter-annual coefficient of variation of nominal GDP was
considered. Likewise, a higher growth rate of GDP has a negative influence on bad loan, so
both the annual growth rate of GDP and the cumulative growth rate were included. These
three variables were introduced with different lags and the recursive procedure in Pastor
(1995b) was used to determine which variables are most influential. The results of this
procedure determined that the most influential variables are the coefficient of variation of
the nominal GDP of the period, the growth rate of nominal GDP of the period, and
cumulative annual growth rate in the last 5 years.
The selection of variables influencing efficiency is, a priori, a much more
complicated task because of the wide range of possibilities. To limit the possibilities in this
study we consider initially the environmental variables that were found by Pastor, Lozano
and Pastor (1997) to be influential, using the procedure in Pastor (1995b): per capita wages,
density of deposits, national income per branch and capital adequacy ratio
20.
5. RESULTS
5.1 Risk management efficiency and decomposition of bad loans
The results obtained with regard to risk management efficiency, incorporating the
environmental variables indicated above and using the different versions, are presented in
                              
19 The data on environmental variables is taken from the Economic Bulletin of the Bank of Spain, Bank
Profitability, Eurostat and INE (National Statistical Institute of Spain). All the variables were expressed in
dollars. See Freixas et al. (1994) for the macroeconomics determinants of loan losses.
20 Pastor, Lozano and Pastor (1997) initially considered the following variables: income per capita, wages per
capita, population density, density of demand, income per, deposits per branch, branches per inhabitant,
branches per square kilometre, capital adequacy ratio and average profitability of the sector.19
figure 1. The evolution of risk management efficiency of each of the countries is very
similar in all techniques, with the sole exception of the one stage method (represented on the
right-hand axis)
21.
Excluding the one stage method because of its limitations in this particular case, it
can be concluded that efficiency in risk management has evolved differently in each country.
While in Italy and Germany it has evolved without a particular trend, France shows a
reduction in the risk management efficiency. In the case of Spain, after a descent of risk
management efficiency during the period 1990-92, it appreciably improved, and by 1994
was at levels higher than in 1988. In general, the average portion of PLL due to internal
factors stands at between 13% and 26%. Spain and Germany are the most efficient countries
in risk management, with an annual average among methods of around 26% followed by
France with 18% and Italy with 13%.
On the basis of the evolution of efficiency in risk management, instead of the overall
evolution of bad loans, the conclusions on the evolution of risk in banking systems are very
different. Thus, although bad loan has increased since 1990 in all countries (graph 1.i), bad
loan due to risk management, with the exception of France where it worsens, either
improves (Spain) or remains steady (Italy and Germany). It is possible, therefore, to
conclude that the increase in competition generated by Community de-regulation processes
does not seem to have pushed firms into riskier business and/or behavior.
Table 2 shows the values of the proportions of bad loans (PLL) attributed to internal
factors  () 1− γ i  in each of the methods, excluding the single stage method. Obviously those
banking systems that are less efficient in risk management have higher proportion of bad
loan due to internal factors. Thus, for the case of Italy the proportion of bad loan due to
internal factors is 87%, whereas in other banking sectors such as those of Spain or Germany
these proportions are lower (around 73%).
                              
21 In the final instance, given that the environmental variables are common to all the firms of the same country,
it is sufficient for a particular country to have a more unfavourable environment in one particular variable for
all the firms of that country to be considered efficient. In the extreme case in which each country has an
unfavourable situation in one of the environmental variables considered, all the firms of all the countries will
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2 Stages 2 Stages (Logist.) 3 Stages (SFA)
3 Stages (DEA) 1 StageFrance Italy
2 stages 3 stages 2 stages 3 stages
Tobit Logit SFA DEA Tobit Logit SFA DEA
1988 65,6 74,0 77,4 76,0 73,3 78,0 91,0 78,9 92,7 85,2
1989 69,9 78,0 76,2 85,2 77,3 78,5 89,0 86,8 89,6 86,0
1990 73,5 83,0 82,0 84,3 80,7 79,5 92,0 90,2 94,9 89,1
1991 74,5 83,0 81,0 84,1 80,7 75,6 84,0 82,4 88,2 82,5
1992 77,8 87,0 86,6 88,2 84,9 78,9 90,0 88,4 93,1 87,6
1993 80,3 91,0 90,2 91,2 88,2 81,8 96,0 94,6 97,3 92,4
1994 74,5 84,0 83,6 85,0 81,7 73,4 90,0 89,1 92,5 86,2
Average 73,7 82,9 82,4 84,9 81,0 78,0 90,3 87,2 92,6 87,0
Spain Germany
2 stages 3 stages 2 stages 3 stages
Tobit Logit SFA DEA Tobit Logit SFA DEA
1988 73,0 82,0 72,0 83,5 77,6 -----
1989 65,3 72,0 70,4 81,4 72,3 -----
1990 61,6 70,0 68,3 71,0 67,7 -----
1991 70,8 79,0 76,7 80,0 76,6 -----
1992 75,3 80,0 78,7 80,6 78,6 69,8 79,0 78,4 80,2 76,9
1993 72,0 77,0 76,3 77,3 75,7 63,3 73,0 72,4 73,6 70,6
1994 63,4 68,0 67,6 68,9 67,0 64,6 77,0 75,9 77,4 73,7
Average 68,8 75,4 72,9 77,5 73,6 65,9 76,3 75,6 77,1 73,7
Table 2 : Percentage of bad loans (PLL) due to internal factors
Average Average
Average Average20
5.2. Efficiency measures adjusted for risk (Phase 2) and adjusted for risk and
environment (Phase 3)
The efficiency measures without adjusting for risk under VRS () ϑ  are presented in
the column [1] of table 3. Their low value is indicative both of the highly heterogeneous
character of the sample and of the existence of significant environmental differences.
Referring, for the sake of simplicity, to the average of the results of all methods, Germany
and France are the most efficient countries, while Italy is the least efficient, though this
order differs according to the period considered. If we compare the results with those
obtained in other studies, the result obtained for 1994 coincides totally with that obtained by
Pastor, Lozano and Pastor (1997), and differs in points from that obtained by Pastor,
Quesada and Pastor (1997) for the year 1992. The evolution of the efficiency of the Spanish
banking sector, slightly decreasing, is very similar to that obtained by Pastor (1995a and
1996).
The efficiency measures adjusted for risk ( ) ρ  are presented in table 3. Column [2]
presents the results when all the bad loans is considered, mean while columns [3] to [6]
present the results when only the proportion of bad loans due to internal factor is considered.
Column [7] show the average of columns [3] to [6] which is also represented in figure 2.
The order of countries changes substantially when credit risk is considered in the
performance of banking firms. Now Spain and Germany are the most efficient countries,
followed by France and Italy, indicating that the consideration of risk may be of vital
importance when evaluating the efficiency and security of banking firms. Indeed, the
inclusion of risk for these countries signifies on average an increase of efficiency of nearly
50%, or in other words the risk management effect (RME) is 0.53 and 0.56 respectively (see
column [13]). Comparatively, this risk effect, or "prize" awarded to the Spanish banking
sector for taking few risks, is higher in the period 1992-1994, during which the efficiency of
risk management of Spanish banks improved notably.
The consideration of environmental variables does not, however, have such a marked
effect on the measurements of efficiency (columns [8] to [12] in  table 3 and figure 2). Thus,
efficiency adjusted for risk and the environment () Ω  improves only slightly the position of
those countries with a more unfavorable environment such as Italy, and to a lesser extentEficiency adjusted for risk Eff. adjusted for risk and environment
Effic. 2 stages 3 stages 2 etapas 3 etapas
VRS Tobit Logit SFA DEA Average Tobit Logit SFA DEA Average
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
1988 25,9 40,7 40,8 40,8 31,9 39,2 38,2 46,3 41,0 42,6 33,1 40,8 0,68 0,94
1989 37,6 37,6 45,6 44,7 44,2 44,2 44,7 47,9 45,0 47,4 44,2 46,1 0,84 0,97
1990 27,1 27,1 43,8 44,0 41,7 42,2 42,9 46,2 44,0 43,5 41,6 43,8 0,63 0,98
1991 30,0 30,0 41,8 41,8 38,4 39,4 40,3 45,1 42,0 40,9 38,4 41,6 0,74 0,97
1992 21,1 21,1 31,1 31,2 30,5 31,0 30,9 32,5 29,0 31,7 30,4 30,9 0,68 1,00
1993 20,0 20,0 26,7 26,9 28,1 28,3 27,5 28,5 24,0 23,0 22,5 24,5 0,73 1,12
1994 19,5 19,5 30,5 30,8 31,9 32,1 31,3 32,9 28,0 33,2 31,8 31,5 0,62 0,99
Average 25,9 28,0 37,2 37,2 35,2 36,6 36,6 39,9 36,1 37,5 34,6 37,0 0,71 0,99
Eficiency adjusted for risk Eff. adjusted for risk and environment
Effic. 2 stages 3 stages 2 etapas 3 etapas
VRS Tobit Logit SFA DEA Average Tobit Logit SFA DEA Average
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
1988 14,2 20,1 19,1 18,9 17,6 16,2 17,9 27,7 19,0 19,9 17,6 21,1 0,79 0,85
1989 28,0 32,8 31,9 31,8 28,3 29,4 30,3 35,1 32,0 30,9 28,3 31,6 0,92 0,96
1990 21,3 34,5 34,9 34,8 30,6 30,8 32,8 37,9 35,0 30,9 29,8 33,4 0,65 0,98
1991 22,2 35,9 35,9 35,9 27,5 28,9 32,0 38,6 36,0 30,6 27,5 33,2 0,69 0,97
1992 13,4 24,1 23,5 23,3 18,0 18,5 20,8 36,5 35,0 22,6 18,0 28,0 0,64 0,74
1993 12,8 17,2 15,2 15,1 13,9 14,2 14,6 32,7 31,0 16,0 14,0 23,4 0,88 0,62
1994 11,9 20,2 19,2 18,5 17,9 18,1 18,4 32,5 31,0 22,5 17,9 26,0 0,64 0,71
Average 17,7 26,4 25,7 25,5 22,0 22,3 23,8 34,4 31,3 24,8 21,9 28,1 0,74 0,85
Eficiency adjusted for risk Eff. adjusted for risk and environment
Effic. 2 stages 3 stages 2 etapas 3 etapas
VRS Tobit Logit SFA DEA Average Tobit Logit SFA DEA Average
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
1988 19,0 29,2 28,8 27,5 26,4 27,4 27,5 35,8 27,0 33,4 26,6 30,7 0,69 0,90
1989 31,0 44,1 44,7 44,8 40,7 40,7 42,8 47,3 45,0 44,3 40,7 44,3 0,73 0,96
1990 20,1 51,1 53,9 54,0 47,5 47,9 50,8 57,2 54,0 49,9 47,4 52,1 0,39 0,98
1991 24,7 43,5 43,9 43,8 39,1 40,5 41,8 47,0 44,0 42,1 39,1 43,1 0,59 0,97
1992 14,8 32,7 31,1 33,1 30,6 31,4 31,6 35,7 34,0 32,2 30,5 33,1 0,47 0,95
1993 14,1 30,6 30,8 31,2 32,5 32,7 31,8 37,1 32,0 30,5 30,0 32,4 0,45 0,98
1994 20,3 45,3 45,4 45,6 44,7 44,9 45,1 50,8 46,0 45,7 44,7 46,8 0,45 0,96
Average 20,6 39,5 39,8 40,0 37,4 37,9 38,8 44,4 40,3 39,7 37,0 40,4 0,53 0,96
Eficiency adjusted for risk Eff. adjusted for risk and environment
Effic. 2 stages 3 stages 2 etapas 3 etapas
VRS Tobit Logit SFA DEA Average Tobit Logit SFA DEA Average
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
1992 26,7 44,8 45,0 45,0 42,5 43,4 44,0 46,6 42,0 44,3 42,5 43,8 0,61 1,00
1993 23,5 39,4 44,8 44,8 44,1 44,3 44,5 47,5 42,0 39,5 38,8 42,0 0,53 1,06
1994 22,3 41,1 41,2 38,7 40,5 40,7 40,3 44,1 37,0 42,3 40,5 41,0 0,55 0,98
Average 24,2 41,8 43,7 42,8 42,3 42,8 42,9 46,1 40,3 42,0 40,6 42,3 0,56 1,02
With all
PLL
With PLL due to internal factors With PLL due to internal factors & env. vbles.
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Efficiency Eff. adjusted for risk Eff. adjusted for risk and environment21
Spain (with an environment effect of 0.83 and 0.96 respectively –see column [14]) whereas
it penalizes banks belonging to banking systems with favorable environments such as
Germany (with an environmental effect of 1.02 –see column [14]), indicating that part of its
advantage in terms of efficiency is fictitiously originated by the environment. The average
efficiency of the French banking system suffers no alteration (environment effect 0.99).
In general, unlike what happens in the case of efficiency in risk management, all
countries underwent a reduction of efficiency from 1990, with an improvement in 1994. It is
impossible to attribute the reduction of efficiency exclusively to Community de-regulation
processes, but it is nonetheless true that this effect is expected in the short term in any de-
regulatory process (Berg et al., 1992 and Humphrey 1993).
6. CONCLUSIONS
Existing literature on banking has paid little attention to the relationship between risk
and efficiency. the few studies that attempt to obtain measurements of efficiency adjusted for
risk are based on the inclusion of risk, measured through bad loan, as an additional input,
implicitly assuming that all bad loan is due to firms' bad management and therefore
excluding the possibility that part of it may be due to adverse economic circumstances. This
procedure provides underestimated measurements of efficiency for those firms that have bad
loans as a result of an adverse environment. Furthermore, none of these studies attempts to
decompose bad loan into its internal and external components.
International comparisons of banking systems have traditionally found high degrees
of inefficiency. This result is a consequence of constructing a common frontier without
considering the influence of environmental variables.
In order to solve these problems in this study we propose a new three phase
sequential procedure, based on the DEA technique, to identify and decompose the origin of
bad loan and to obtain measurements of efficiency adjusted for risk and environment that are
more refined than those hitherto proposed in other studies. In the first phase the procedure22
enables the total bad loan of each bank to be decomposed into its two components: one part
due to bad risk management and another due to exogenous economic and environmental
factors. For this we used several approaches for incorporating environmental variables into
DEA, in order to test whether there were significant differences in the results. In the second
phase, incorporating into the model only that part of bad loan that was due to bad
management, measurements of efficiency adjusted for risk were obtained. Finally, in the
third phase, by incorporating economic environment variables, we obtained efficiency
indicators which, as well as being adjusted for risk, are adjusted for the economic
environment.
The results obtained indicate that the technique proposed is not sensitive to the
method of incorporation of environmental variables used. With the exception of the single
stage method, all the methods give similar results. In general, efficiency in risk management
improves in the case of the Spanish banking system, worsens in France, and remains stable
in Italy and Germany. On average, the decomposition of bad loan into its internal and
external components gives the result that about 80% of bad loan is due to factors internal to
firms, while the rest is attributable to circumstances exogenous to firms.
Traditional measurements of efficiency, without adjustment for risk, are substantially
different from those adjusted for risk. This feature is particularly important in those
countries that are most efficient in risk management, such as Spain and Germany. In these
cases, the "risk effect" or prize for being secure banking systems, is approximately 50%. The
inclusion of environmental factors enabled efficiency to be corrected for the influence of
environmental factors. In general, the results indicate that around 2% of the efficiency of the
German banking system was fictitiously due to favorable economic circumstances
(environment effect 1.02) whereas in other banking systems like those of Spain and Italy,
subjected to unfavorable environments, efficiency was being under-estimated by 4% and
17% respectively (environment effect of 0.96 and 0.83 respectively).23
APPENDIX
Three stage model
a) Stochastic frontier approach (SFA)
In this case the slacks - obtained in the first stage after solving problem (2) - are
regressed against the environmental variables in a model that adopts the following
specification:
[A.1] () ln ln ; sfZ v u ii i i =+ + β
where  () fZ i ln ;β  is the deterministic frontier to be estimated with an error structure
composed of a random term whose distribution is assumed to be normal,  vN iv ~( ,) 0
2 σ
and a term  ui ≥ 0.
The above expression is interpreted as the minimum slack that can be achieved in an
environment with noise (vi) and given the environmental variables. Any excess slack (UI>0)
is due to pure inefficiency, as correction has been made for environment.
Using the procedure of  Jondrow et al. (1982)  it is possible to separate the
components of inefficiency  (ui) from noise (vi). Operating on the above expression, Fried et
al. (1996) obtain corrected slacks that represent the excess of the minimum slacks given the
environment
22.
[A.2]  () [] {} () [] {} () [] ss fZ v fZ v u i i ii ii i
* exp ln ; exp ln ; exp =− + = + ∗ −≥ ββ 10
Fried et al. (1996) propose adding these corrected slacks ( )
* si  to the original inputs
to obtain corrected inputs, in our case bad loan corrected for the influence of environment
( )
*
i PLL , by means of  the following expression:
[A.3] () [] {} ( ) [] i i i i i i PLL u v Z f PLL PLL ≥ − ∗ + + = 1 exp ; ln exp
* β24
These corrected inputs (PLL
*) are considered to cleanse bad loan of the effect of
environmental variables, so that its use together with the original outputs in a DEA model in
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In this version, Fried et al. (1996) propose the inclusion of the sacks obtained in the
first stage after solving problem (2) together with the environmental variables (Zi) in the
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The interpretation of these efficiency indices  ( ) η i , is the same as that of the
efficiency indices  (ui) of the parametric stochastic version, so that following the same
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22 Note that if  ui=0  then  s
*
i= si,, which means that no adjustment would be made.
23 Note that as in single stage models this procedure requires the imposition of the orientation of the influence
of each environmental variable.25
In those cases in which the firm is slack-efficient  ( ) η i = 1  no correction would be








* are used, together with the outputs (loans) in the third stage in
a DEA model identical to (7) to obtain the definitive indicators of "efficiency in risk
management"( ) γ i .26
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